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CHARLES ENOCH, GILLIAN GARCIA, and V. SUNDARARAJAN
*
Recapitalizing banks in a systemic crisis is a complex medium-term process that
requires significant government intervention and careful management at both the
strategic and individual bank levels. This paper examines the range of operational
and strategic issues involved and the institutional arrangements needed to foster
an effective banking system restructuring, as well as maximize the returns on
government investment. Recapitalization approaches have varied in the different
mixes of direct capital injections and asset purchases and rehabilitation that coun-
tries choose. The choice of an appropriate mix is critical to minimizing the
expected present value of government outlays net of recoveries. [JEL G1, G21,
G32, H81, O16]
C
onsider the following scenario: a banking crisis has erupted and has begun
to intensify and spread. In response, the government decides to restructure
and recapitalize the banks in order to overcome the negative effects of a dysfunc-
tioning banking system on economic growth and wealth. This decision is taken
because weaknesses in the financial system and extreme uncertainty that prevails
during the crisis have limited private capital, and the government fears that banks
will fail in large numbers. It hopes that the injection of public funds to strengthen
bank capital, together with additional financial and operational restructuring of
banks, will restore public confidence in the banking system, reduce uncertainty,
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accelerate resolution of the banking crisis, and promote economic recovery
through reestablishing banking and payment services, and ensuring that viable
businesses can fund their operations. From 1994 to 1999 these circumstances
confronted a number of countries in Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, the former
Soviet Union (FSU), and the Americas.
In systemic bank restructuring, public funds may be needed to (1) make
payouts to depositors of closed banks; (2) compensate banks that agree to accept
deposit transfers; (3) facilitate an acquisition, merger, or purchase and assump-
tion; (4) help recapitalize banks; and (5) restructure assets. This paper focuses
specifically on operational and technical issues that relate to the last two items:
the granting of assistance through capital injections and asset rehabilitation to
facilitate the continued operation of banks that are to be kept open. The paper
examines, in sequential order, the choices that must be made and the steps that
have to be taken to implement the decisions. The discussion draws on the experi-
ences of five Asian countries, Mexico, Sweden, and the United States.
For many of the issues covered in this paper1 there is no single practice that is
clearly superior based on theoretical or analytical grounds. Decisions must be taken
case by case, and often they are based on specific institutional factors—such as the
legal system of the country or the availability of skilled resources to manage problem
assets. Drawing on the experiences of select countries, this paper seeks to identify the
important factors influencing the decisions in such trade-offs, as well as the best prac-
tices that should be adopted given whichever choice the authorities make.
I. Bank Restructuring Agency: Organizational Issues
Our analysis starts at the point where the government intervenes in a
banking/currency crisis by using public funds for bank recapitalization. Before
reaching this point the government should have made a preliminary estimation of
the costs of restoring a functional banking system.2 The government should have
formulated an overall strategy for bank restructuring, encompassing the following
key elements: (1) diagnosis; (2) triage;3 (3) prompt exit of nonviable banks;4 (4)
a well-designed recapitalization strategy for viable and essential banks; (5) oper-
ational restructuring of banks; (6) efficient management and recovery of nonper-
forming assets, supported by loan workouts; (7) equitable loss-sharing
arrangements and containment of public sector costs; and (8) a strengthening of
prudential supervision of banks to prevent further accumulation of losses.
1The paper does not discuss in detail certain related matters, such as the rationale for the use of public
funds, the deposit insurance agency (DIA), the need for, and methods of, taking legal recourse against
criminal acts, and corporate restructuring. More in-depth discussions of forbearance, asset management
corporations, and lender of last resort facilities are presented in other papers.
2The design and sequencing of bank restructuring and prudential supervision reforms, taking into
account their macroeconomic impact, are discussed in Alexander and others (1997), and Sundararajan
(1999).
3See Appendix I for a definition of the term.
4The form of resolution for a problem bank—closure and liquidation, partial or complete merger,
temporary “bridge bank,” or support to keep the bank operating—depends upon the bank’s governance,
its financial condition, and its franchise value.Of course, a key limitation on the government’s plans for intervention is the
amount of public funds it has available. However, an equally fundamental
constraint is the availability of human resources, which will influence the organi-
zational structures used in the intervention. These constraints may be more
binding in some countries than in others.5
Putting a recapitalization strategy into operation will frequently require legal
and institutional changes, including the possible creation of public bodies, such as
a bank restructuring agency (BRA) to oversee the comprehensive restructuring
strategy. The BRA establishes the principles by which some banks are selected for
closing and others for recapitalizing and restructuring. The BRA may have two
key components or subsidiaries: a bank support authority (BSA) that holds equity,
and in some cases may lend to safeguard the value of its equity holdings; and one
or more asset management companies (AMCs)6 that manage and restructure the
assets taken from intervened banks, and buy bad loans and dispose of them.7 In the
case of Sweden, authorities created an oversight board for the BRA, with separate
AMCs as subsidiaries. Sweden, which has a relatively developed financial system
with considerable operating experience in a market environment, nevertheless
encountered shortages of financially skilled labor to run these organizations. In
other situations, such as in transition economies, a simpler structure with clear
lines of authority and accountability may be more appropriate.
The authorities must make a number of organizational decisions relating to the
BRA. The first is whether to use existing agencies or create a new organization—
to oversee recapitalization and restructuring, take control of funds that have
already been committed, make and manage additional investments in banks, and
later sell them cost-effectively.8 Where a deposit insurance agency (DIA) is
already in place and can be expected to competently manage the crisis, it may be
augmented to handle the challenge, but such a situation is relatively unusual. Often
there is no DIA; in some cases the existing DIA is blamed for allowing banking
problems to deteriorate into the current crisis; and, typically, the magnitude of the
crisis is so grave that a new agency is needed.9
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5The government should appoint independent, professionally competent executives and boards to
manage banks that are taken over. If it proves difficult to find such individuals, the use of international
bankers, accounting firms, and investment bankers becomes critical to fill part of the human resources
gap. Otherwise, human resource constraints may influence the design of the restructuring and recapital-
ization program, and place a premium on identifying economies of scale in resolving banks, and on effi-
cient clustering of banks.
6See Nyberg (1997).
7In the early stages of a bank restructuring process, provision of proper information to the public
helps to restore confidence, and such information will include a brief description of the organizational
structure that will be established to manage the bank restructuring and the legislative changes necessary
to set up the BRA and to grant it powers to successfully discharge its responsibilities.
8See Nyberg (1997).
9Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand have no DIA and thus required a special agency. Although Korea has
an existing DIA, it also created a special agency to handle its bank problems. During the bank and thrift prob-
lems of the late 1980s and early 1990s in the United States, the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) was judged able
to handle the banking problems and resolved 1,394 failed banks between 1984 and 1992. The thrift regulator
and insurer, however, were replaced by a new regulator, and a special temporary agency, the Resolution Trust
Corporation (RTC), was created to manage the crisis (Alexander and others, 1997, pp. 86–91).The second decision is whether to make the agency independent or an integral
part of the government. The agency in charge of restructuring will need clear legal
authority to determine—using universally applied and transparent criteria—which
banks should receive public capital assistance and which should not. The agency
should be autonomous to make and implement resolution decisions, and also be
held accountable for its actions. After decisions are implemented, they need to be
made transparent and explained thoroughly. No governments give full indepen-
dence to a BRA where a large percentage of GDP is devoted to recapitalizing
banks. Accountability to parliament in most countries is achieved through a
ministry. The Ministry of Finance (MOF), as guardian of the public purse, is a
typical choice among government agencies to manage restructuring. The central
bank or an independent bank supervisor are also possibilities. Government agen-
cies, however, are not usually involved in the day-to-day business of running
banks, and when they attempt to do so, the arrangement has frequently not been
very effective because of governance problems. Consequently, while it is appro-
priate that the government’s interest in the success of the BRA’s operations be
explicitly recognized in the agency’s organizational structure, it should also
protect the operating units from political interference in the day-to-day operations,
and make them to be functionally independent, and publicly accountable.
While there are several ways to achieve a compromise between accountability
and independence, one institutional model for bank restructuring is shown in
Figure 1. Within this framework, the BRA is an agency subordinate to the MOF
and separate from an independent central bank, the supervisory agency,10 and the
DIA.11 It is wise not to place the BRA within the central bank, so as to avoid
incentives to finance restructuring through money creation. It can also be argued
that the supervisory agency should not run the BRA because it has no sources of
finance and may be tempted to give preferential supervisory treatment to banks
that it owns. Moreover, while the DIA could handle nonsystemic banking failures,
it lacks the financial and human resources and the authority to deal successfully
with a systemic crisis. 
Most countries find a need for an overarching board to liaise with other parts
of the government, and to coordinate and supervise subsidiaries’ activities. The
MOF and the central bank should be represented on the BRA’s oversight board
together with the agency’s chief executive officer (CEO), and a number of knowl-
edgeable and independent members of the public.12 The composition of such a
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10In Figure 1 the supervisory agency is shown within the central bank. An alternative diagram could
show the supervisory agency as a separate institution.
11Indonesia and Thailand placed their BRAs subordinate to their ministries of finance. In Malaysia,
the BRA is run by the central bank, which is only quasi-independent of the MOF. Korea’s BRA is a
subsidiary of its independent supervisory agency. Japan and Mexico have involved their DIAs to some
extent in bank restructuring and recapitalization. The United States created an independent agency, the
RTC, to handle failed thrifts, but not failed banks. (However, the RTC spent a smaller percentage of
GDP—roughly 2 percent of GDP in the mid-1990s—on failed thrifts than the countries considered in this
paper incurred in restructuring their banking systems.) Stylized models of actual experiences in various
countries are shown in Figures A1 through A8, in Appendix II.
12If the supervisory agency is outside the central bank, one may well wish to have a representative of
the supervisory agency on the BRA’s oversight board.board would be an acceptable compromise between including all interested parties
or confining membership to too small a number. In cases where the supervisory
agency or the DIA is not formally represented on the oversight board, they would
need to maintain close relations with its operational arms. The supervisor must
keep the BRA informed on the condition of banks, especially those that are dete-
riorating and close to closure or recapitalization. 
The relationship of the DIA to the BRA depends in part on the breadth of the
DIA’s past role. In cases where its role was limited to compensating depositors of
failed banks, that function may be temporarily overridden by a comprehensive
guarantee, which is funded by the government and may fall to the BRA to execute.
In other cases where the DIA acted as the receiver/liquidator of failed banks, one
of many organizational possibilities is that its responsibilities are temporarily
taken over by the BRA with the DIA staff reassigned there, while the DIA is
temporarily a subsidiary of the BRA. These possible relationships are shown for
selected countries in Figures A1 through A8 in Appendix II.
The responsibilities of the oversight board are to plan the restructuring and
recapitalization exercises, assess the appropriate level of fiscal resources for
restructuring and recapitalization, and strike a balance between these needs and
the fiscal constraints faced by the government. It must not only liaise with the
government, but also insulate its operational subsidiaries from political pressure,
and keep the public informed of the agency’s plans and its progress toward
achieving them. Transparency should be a goal and it would be increased through
auditing the BRA (at least annually), designing appropriate accountability and
disclosure arrangements, and requiring reporting to parliament in public hearings.

















Figure 1. Institutional Framework Under the Minister of Finance
1Includes representatives of other agencies, including the central bank, and the supervisory agency.Details of the institutional structures that have been established in six coun-
tries in order to handle bank restructuring are shown in Table 1.
II. The Bank Restructuring Agency: Terms and 
Conditions for Assistance
The BRA needs to observe several broad principles when using public funds to
recapitalize banks and administer restructuring plans. First, the strategy must hold
owners of a failing bank responsible for losses, and make managers accountable
for their actions. An incentive structure for both the public and the private sectors
that discourages a recurrence of banking problems needs to be put into place.
Second, the industrial structure of the rehabilitated banking system must provide
core banking services and must be based on the desirable long-term structure of
the financial services industry. Third, the end strategy should convert the govern-
ment’s investments back into cash and return the banking sector to private control.
Fourth, the BRA must take control of public funds that have already been spent,
for example, by converting into equity13 the lender-of-last-resort assistance that
the central banks, in a number of countries, gave to illiquid and insolvent institu-
tions that were to be recapitalized.14 Fifth, the restructuring strategy should strive
to minimize the amount of public funds used (expenditures net of recoveries) to
achieve the objectives of restructuring, and ensure that these funds are dispensed
in an efficient, equitable, and cost-effective manner, and that the government
obtains securities in some form that support its right to future repayment in
exchange for its investment. 
In addition to providing finance directly to recapitalize the bank, the BRA
must also make a judgment about how much of the bank’s impaired assets should
be taken off the bank’s books (e.g., transferred or sold to a separate unit, such as
an asset management company) so that the assets can be managed separately.
Separation of these assets can help to normalize bank operations and maximize
asset recovery, thereby improving the yield on funds invested in bank capital.
When the problem bank is fully taken over and controlled by the government, this
typically involves transferring an appropriate volume and type of assets to a sepa-
rate AMC controlled by the government or the BRA. In some situations, the
government finances only a part of banks’ capital needs, with the private sector
providing the rest and sharing ownership, while at the same time, it assists banks
with purchases of some of the impaired assets (for example, by acting through an
AMC owned or controlled by the government or the BRA); in these cases, the
appropriate allocation of budgetary funds between direct recapitalization and
financing (or facilitating) asset purchases becomes an issue. These decisions
involve a number of considerations, including the degree of insolvency and
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13For example, Thailand converted Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF) support into
equity.
14Central banks rank a failed bank’s assets according to whether they hold collateral against their
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Table 1. Government Agencies Associated with Bank Recapitalization
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Source: IMF staff analysis.government ownership, the nature of impaired assets, and the type of arrange-
ments to manage these assets most effectively, taking into account internal gover-
nance of banks and the country’s legal and institutional environment to enforce
property rights and restructure assets. For instance, loans to the national airline
may be best managed centrally, while loans to local farmers may be best left on
the books of the bank. Overall, a bank should not have all the problem loans taken
off its books—it should be “normalized,” not “supernormalized,” both to ensure a
level playing field with banks that do not receive assistance and to avoid excessive
costs to the public sector.
The principal operational responsibility of the oversight board is to approve
the conditions for government assistance eligibility and the terms under which it
is granted. Eligibility conditions for public assistance in a bank recapitalization
should reflect financial and operational criteria that also assess viability and good
governance. More specifically, the eligibility conditions should ensure that a bank:
• has  “fit-and-proper” owners and managers (including new ones) or is placed
under conservatorship until they can be located;
•  recognizes the full extent of its losses, based on realistic valuation criteria;
• submits an acceptable business plan that covers recapitalization to required
capital levels and operational restructuring to assure future profitability; and
• mobilizes private sector owners (existing or new) to put up, at least, an agreed
portion of the new capital and assumes responsibility for operation of the
institution.15
The terms accompanying the provision of public assistance to an eligible bank
should ensure adequate financial and operational restructuring and provide incen-
tives for private owners to rapidly resume efficient and profitable operations. The
terms of access to a public capital facility normally include agreements with banks
to: (1) restructure operations and balance sheets, with binding performance targets
in a memorandum of understanding (MOU), using proper accounting principles,
and, if necessary, through due diligence scrutiny by special auditors;16 (2) accept
specified restrictions on operations in case of noncompliance; and (3) make
arrangements for the repayment of public assistance and the return of ownership
to the private sector. 
Although the scope and details of the terms would vary according to country-
and bank-specific circumstances, these terms could include the following contin-
uing obligations on banks:
• Suspend dividends or incur other sanctions whenever the bank is below the
minimum capital adequacy ratio (CAR) or violates specified performance
criteria, including achievement of prudential requirements (e.g., maximum
open foreign exchange positions) and operational restructuring (e.g., rational-
izing the bank’s branch structure). Accept arrangements that would trigger an
intensification of government control; for example, a conversion of preferred
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15These partners need to have sufficient capital at risk to give them a strong incentive to stay with the
institution and to work for its survival. 
16In Thailand banks’financial conditions were assessed by special audits by the banks’external audi-
tors; in Indonesia, by contrast, all banks were audited by international accounting firms. In some FSU
countries overseas supervisors assisted in the assessment of banks’ financial condition.shares acquired by the government into common stock, under one or more of
the following conditions: (1) when the CAR falls below a specified level; (2)
when the supervisor judges that the bank has otherwise failed to comply with
the terms imposed upon it, and when the violations were avoidable and mate-
rial; or (3) when a previously specified point in time is reached. For example,
under specified conditions, the interest of existing shareholders would be
substantially diluted, and the government would obtain voting control as well
as the right to replace management.
• Accept official oversight through regular and frequent reporting, off-site and
on-site inspections to monitor compliance with time-specific performance
targets for (1) achieving loan classification and provisioning standards; (2)
making improvements to procedures governing credit assessment, risk
management, loan workout, and collateral control; (3) streamlining opera-
tions; (4) cutting costs; (5) bringing excessive foreign exchange positions,
connected lending, and other infringements into compliance with prudential
standards; and (6) arranging government representation on the board of direc-
tors where it is deemed necessary by the BSA and the supervisor.17
• Allow the public sector to obtain an increasing percentage of the bank’s net
income over time as remuneration for its investment, and as an incentive for
the bank to buy out the government’s stake as soon as possible. With this
design, public funds become progressively burdensome and so the bank will
seek to repay its obligation to the government and replace public funds with
private capital.
• Participate in efforts to restructure corporate debt, to ensure maximization of
loan payments and loan recoveries, and to minimize the capital infusion that
the government and owners have to provide.
To be equitable and to allow the government to cash out of its investment, if
there are private owners left, they should be given an option to redeem the govern-
ment’s capital either throughout the period, or at a specified point in time. In
general, the terms of recapitalization could also include incentives for new investors
in the form of guarantees, such as stop-loss and income-maintenance agreements.
III. Key Decisions
To achieve the objectives for efficient restructuring set by the BRA, its operational
arms—the BSA and the AMC—must jointly make decisions concerning certain
operational issues related to granting capital assistance to banks. Issues discussed
in this section include: (1) the valuation of individual banks’ portfolios and their
future prognosis; (2) whether support should be uniformly available to all viable
banks, or only to those institutions identified as having systemic importance; (3)
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17While many of these functions would be part of the normal, day-to-day work of the supervisors,
there may well be a case for stronger supervision of recapitalized banks. In Indonesia the central bank
established a special surveillance unit to focus on the largest of these banks. Also, while the government
has representatives on the boards of the recapitalized private banks, the Indonesian government has agreed
to a memorandum of understanding with the private owners not to participate in the day-to-day running
of the business.the selection of individual banks that qualify for and will receive assistance; (4)
whether support should be conditional on a full or partial write-off of existing
shareholders’ claims; and (5) the target level of capitalization that the facility
should help the banks to achieve. Other operational issues such as what instru-
ments to use and the means of paying for them are discussed in the next section.
Asset Valuation and Forecasting
Realistic valuation of a bank’s balance sheets and off-balance-sheet exposures is a
prerequisite for an effective recapitalization strategy, and for an assessment of
capital shortfalls. Such valuation is difficult in a crisis environment pervaded by
uncertainty because the usual indicators of value are not available, particularly in
a crisis and in transition economies. Market prices do not exist where trading has
ceased or been disrupted. In addition, the lack of a reliable basis for estimating
cash flows, owing to the high volatility of exchange and interest rates in a crisis,
impedes valuation based on appropriately discounted present values. The valua-
tion of classified assets, in particular, can be especially problematic.
Moreover, the valuation process is particularly challenging because what is
needed is more than a static assessment of current conditions; a prediction of
future viability is also essential for identifying banks for recapitalization.18 Unless
it is carefully managed, however, self-assessment invites adoption of favorable and
self-serving forecasting assumptions, while external assessments may not be
feasible or affordable.
Thus, given the uncertainty during banking crises, alternative valuation
approaches have been used to temper the assessments based on traditional proce-
dures. Banks have a responsibility to continually value their assets and make provi-
sions for losses in order to keep their capital intact, and external auditors and
supervisors also have a responsibility to continually challenge the banks’valuations.
In a banking crisis, however, the authorities in some countries have tried to ascertain
realistic values for assets by requiring banks to undertake a special self-assessment
of the value of their asset portfolios and future prospects, based on tightened regu-
lations governing loan classification and provisioning, and clear guidance on the
assumptions to be employed and the procedures to be followed. In other countries,
the BSA has made or checked the assessment itself using, for example, discounted
present values of projected income flows. It has also sought independent valuations
of bank portfolios by using international accounting firms or investment banks to
complement supervisory assessments and external audits. 
However, each of these approaches has drawbacks: self-assessments may be
biased because of conflicts of interest, other local assessments may not carry suffi-
cient credibility in the market, government assessments may appear inflexible, and
international assessors may have a less complete picture of local conditions.
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18Sweden, for example, required banks to provide to the BRA data based on universally applied
criteria on a common date. The BRA then fed the information obtained from banks and data from other
sources (including macroeconomic data and predictions) into a forecasting model, which outlined each
bank’s likely development over the next three to five years. See Ingves and Lind (1997).Moreover, critics claim that the auditors place exceptionally low values on assets,
perhaps to permit international partners to sign the audits without fearing that the
auditors could later be sued for over-optimism in an uncertain environment.19 In
addition, the auditors may face a conflict of interest if other clients are in line to
become the major purchasers of the banks or their assets.
The authorities making restructuring decisions, therefore, have to adopt a
pragmatic and transparent approach that incorporates consistent assumptions
about key economic variables and best-practice accounting standards, and one that
also combines and reconciles alternative valuations to form a realistic judgment.
In addition, prospective private investors will want to make their own diligent
valuations before deciding whether to acquire equity stakes in banks. Where
authorities believe that banks can and will value their assets fairly and realistically,
they should require banks to do so. But these valuations need to be checked either
by external assessors or the BSA. Where banks cannot or will not conduct a fair
assessment, international accounting firms should be hired to do the valuations. In
turn, their credibility will need to be checked by the BSA. In all cases, the author-
ities must clearly specify that the dates for the assessment, the assumptions, and
the procedures adopted be the same for assessing asset values and forecasting
bank viability.
What Institutions Should Be Eligible for Government Assistance?
One important consideration is whether assistance should be confined to commer-
cial banks or include other types of depository institutions, such as savings banks
and credit unions, and other financial institutions such as insurance companies,
investment banks, and brokerage houses. The answer depends partly on the impor-
tance of these institutions’role in an economy. As a general principle, commercial
banks rank first in priority, because they are vulnerable to runs in a financial crisis
and can have systemic effects. Savings banks, which are sometimes government
owned, and house the small savings of households, are usually also eligible for
assistance for social and political reasons. Other types of financial institutions
usually have lower priority in claiming public funds.20
In general, capital assistance should be available for a limited period to all
(commercial and savings) banks that meet the established financial and opera-
tional criteria set by the BRA, and that are both willing and able to meet the terms
of assistance (laid out in the previous section) so that they can attain a specified
minimum CAR and adequate operational restructuring. Capital assistance may
Charles Enoch, Gillian Garcia, and V. Sundararajan
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19This criticism was made of the “Big Five” international accounting firms’work in Indonesia. Also,
the Korean government wanted an assessment quickly, and the international partners of the international
accounting firms declared themselves unable to sign the audits within the time frame allowed, which
reduced their impact.
20The near-failure of a major hedge fund in the United States, in 1998, raised concerns about systemic
effects on the banking system and prompted official efforts to preserve the financial institution, which was
in the end saved exclusively through the use of private funds. Similarly, the Bank of England rescued
Johnson Matthey because of its activities in the gold market. also be available to banks that meet certain critical needs—for instance, a bank
that is the sole provider of payments services in a particular region. 
Eligibility for recapitalization should be determined primarily, but not solely,
on the basis of financial and operational criteria that indicate potential viability.
However, countries sometimes decide that a classification based solely on finan-
cial and operational criteria would not provide a workable resolution for banks that
are weak but deemed essential, or of systemic importance to the economy. For
example, it may not be feasible to close a very large bank in an orderly fashion, or
one that dominates a region of the country, underpins the payments system, or has
a special niche in the credit markets. Such exceptions to resolution criteria on the
grounds of “essentiality” should be made only under very limited and tightly
managed conditions to thwart political pressures.21
The resolution of both private and state-owned banks should be broadly
governed by the same objectives and principles, although the resolution of state
banks may often face special circumstances due to their size and credit exposures.
As with the private banks, recapitalization of state banks should be linked to real-
istic valuation based on internationally accepted accounting standards, fit-and-
proper management, and financial and operational restructuring to ensure viability
and adherence to prudential standards.
Which Banks Should Receive Government Assistance?
To determine which banks to give assistance to, the BSA must first do a classifi-
cation. Figure 2 shows an example of four categories of banks. All of these begin
from a position of measured capital above the CAR. In the worst category, Bank
D is projected to deteriorate rapidly into deep and irretrievable insolvency. There
does not appear to be any reason for this bank to receive direct government assis-
tance because where there is a blanket guarantee and the bank is small, it is
preferable to pay off the depositors and arrange to dispose of the assets rather
than to recapitalize the bank. If the bank is large, however, and systemically
important, the least-cost solution may still be recapitalization. Banks B and C in
Figure 2 are under consideration for direct assistance; they fall below the
minimum required capital level but ultimately are expected to recover if assisted.
Bank B might recover very slowly without assistance, but Bank C would not.
Both of these banks are willing and able to meet the terms and conditions of
assistance discussed in Section II above. Bank A, in the fourth and best category,
remains solvent without assistance.22
A difficult decision is whether to aid Bank B, which the valuation exercise
predicts has a higher probability of recovering without aid as compared with Bank
C, which is expected to become insolvent without financial assistance but which
could recover with aid. If the BRA believes that the country is “over-banked,” and
neither bank is systemically important, it could close both. If it judges that the
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21For instance, in Indonesia, the authorities declared that all the state banks were “too big to fail” and
all would be recapitalized.
22See Ingves and Lind (1997).country is over-banked but that it needs to assist one bank in order to maintain
sufficient competition among banks, it should aid the stronger Bank B and close
Bank C. If both banks are needed, the BRA may support both. If budgetary
resources are constrained, the BRA will need to try to spread out the necessary
financing over a longer period or elicit greater private sector participation,
including foreign investment.
Treatment of Existing Shareholders’ Claims
As a general rule, the financial claims of banks’ existing shareholders and subor-
dinated debtors should be written down in accordance with their seniority in the
legal system in order to cover the losses an institution has incurred. Apart from
reducing the contribution of public funds needed to eliminate the possible nega-
tive net worth of the institution, this write-down also avoids setting precedents that
can result in moral hazard. Where limited liability is not in force, shareholders
may also be required to subscribe additional capital.
In crisis situations, such as in Asia in 1997–98, banks can fail as a result of
past directed lending and exogenous factors (e.g., macroeconomic instability)
despite good management, “fit-and-proper” owners, and initially strong capital-
ization. In these cases, the government may face a moral or legal responsibility to


























Figure 2. Expected Capital Ratios for Four Categories of Banks
(Capital adequacy ratio, percent)
Source: Adapted from Ingves and Lind (1997).repay the losses, and may take steps to keep existing owners and managers in
place, and to persuade them to invest new capital.23
In some countries, the insolvency that is revealed from writing down owners’
capital triggers supervisory action in which the bank loses its license, and is either
merged or closed and liquidated. In other countries, the legal system allows
owners to remain in control of the bank even after their shares have been written
down to nominal values.24 At times it may be necessary to allow existing share-
holders to retain partial ownership rights in order to obtain their cooperation, and
to avoid time-consuming and costly legal wrangles. Where the authorities are
considering supporting an insolvent bank whose shareholders are protected, such
support should be predicated on the shareholders themselves also providing new
capital. 
Experience has shown that owners, especially new investors, may be induced
to provide fresh capital if the uncertainty they face is reduced by instruments that
guarantee outcomes. For example, the government may agree to share losses with
the owner or new investor (in a “loss-sharing” arrangement); place a cap (a “stop-
loss” provision) on the amount a bank may lose; agree to maintain bank income
at a specified level (in an “income- or yield-maintenance” provision); or allow the
bank to return some or all of the bad assets it purchases to the government
(through a “put-back” provision). More specifically, such guarantees and options
can be given, with appropriate safeguards, to limit an acquirer’s losses during a
review period (in which additional questions on “skeletons” may come to light).
Guarantees may cover asset values or yields that an institution will earn on
certain assets specified in the recapitalization contract.25 While inducements to
new investment have been used successfully in many countries, a government
needs to be confident that it can convey positive incentives to new owners to
maximize both the value of recoveries and efforts to maintain and improve the
value of the acquired assets. Guarantees can create an illusion of ownership in
that, technically, a bank can have private ownership while all the risk is borne by
the government.
Finally, using the legal system to obtain redress for criminal acts or regulatory
violations committed by owners and others may reduce the government’s fiscal
obligations, while preserving incentives for good governance.
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23For example, even where shares are written down to zero, human resource constraints might suggest
that “fit-and-proper” shareholders be retained on the board of directors and be given stock options tied to
future performance. Alternatively, an insolvent bank might be closed and a new charter issued to the
former owners, conditional upon their injection of new capital. On the other hand, the mere fact that there
was directed lending, or government interference, does not mean that banks’managements can necessarily
walk away completely from the problems in their banks. Their “fitness and propriety” as well as respon-
sibility for problems in the past may well be a matter of judgment for the authorities in general, and for
the bank supervisors in particular.
24The former applies in most industrial countries; the latter, for example, in most Asian crisis countries.
25These techniques have all been used by the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) and the RTC in the United
States. Malaysia has provided asset guarantees to acquirers of merged finance companies, Korea has given
put options to acquiring banks in purchases and assumptions (P&As), and Thailand has provided stop-loss
guarantees and yield-maintenance agreements to new investors taking over intervened banks.The Size of the Recapitalization
When there is a blanket guarantee for depositors and other creditors, recapitalizing
a bank to a zero CAR (bare solvency) is roughly equivalent to honoring the guar-
antee without making a payout to depositors and creditors. In systemic crises,
recapitalizing to bare solvency, given the limited supply of private capital
(domestic and foreign), may not be sufficient to establish credibility in the sound-
ness of a recapitalized banking system, and it may well be desirable for the
government to recapitalize selected banks to some positive minimum level. Where
the fiscal situation permits, the government may recapitalize banks to the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision standards or even higher, while taking a
commensurate ownership interest.26 Such decision will depend on competing
fiscal demands as well as on how much authorities expect “overcapitalization” to
restore confidence in the system among bank customers and potential investors. 
Burden-Sharing Recapitalization
The amount of public funds needed to recapitalize the banking system depends, in
part, on the willingness of private investors—existing and new—to put up a share
of the capital needed. Their willingness in turn will depend on the distribution of
ownership after recapitalization, and the guarantees and contractual terms
designed to reduce uncertainty and apportion losses and profits.
Where the law does not call for limited liability for bank owners, shareholders
may be required to recapitalize their bank. Even where limited liability is in place,
it may be possible to design the recapitalization so that the shareholders are
encouraged to reduce the call on government funds in certain ways.27 They might
be induced to: (1) bear losses beyond their original capital and share the financial
responsibility with the government for “filling the gap” and bringing the bank up
to bare solvency; and (2) contribute additional capital to help meet the minimum
CAR. This approach of persuading existing shareholders to “fill in the gap” is
equivalent to denying limited liability—a provision frequently regarded as a
protection needed to encourage shareholders to invest in an enterprise or bank.28
In order to encourage new shareholders to participate in a recapitalization, it
may be necessary to give them preferences over existing shareholders. Such pref-
erences could be, for example, that old shareholders shoulder the burden of any
additional depreciation of existing assets before new shareholders are called upon
to incur losses.29 Any additional losses on specified old assets would be under-
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26Korean banks have been recapitalized to 10 percent, to allow them to survive some further deterio-
ration in asset quality.
27Unlimited liability is not uncommon. Before granting a license, supervisors frequently require
shareholders to undertake, for example, in a comfort letter to keep their bank adequately capitalized.
28Nevertheless, this approach is being tried in Indonesia, where the capital support facility for private
banks requires contributions from existing shareholders to “fill in the gap” in return for the opportunity to
buy back the government shares later and to reacquire the bank under specific conditions. 
29The published Joint Statement of August 14, 1998, from the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of
Thailand imposes this condition.written by a government guarantee so that new shareholders are only held respon-
sible for losses incurred on the nonguaranteed assets. Alternatively, new share-
holders could receive, at least for a limited time, a disproportionately larger share
of future dividends. In some countries, the laws (for example, those that govern
rights issues) would need to be changed to permit such differentiation among
shareholders. In other countries, it may be sufficient to persuade old shareholders
to agree to the arrangement on pain of being dispossessed entirely.
IV. Modalities of Government Support: Capital Injections
After making decisions about which banks to recapitalize, the BSA must then
choose the best ways to provide the funding. In principle, there are a number of
instruments that the government can use to strengthen a bank’s capital adequacy:
injecting capital with public funds; rehabilitating assets; reducing liabilities; and
improving net income.30 This section focuses on issues related to capital injec-
tions, particularly what instruments to use and how to pay for them. Other instru-
ments are discussed in the following two sections.
Tier 1 and Tier 2 Instruments
An increase in paid-in equity or Tier 1 capital is the preferred form of recapital-
ization because it improves the capital ratios, can enhance profitability, and is
essential under the Basel Capital Accord. It does not involve immediate servicing
costs, since dividend payments could and should be postponed until the bank’s
capital and income are fully and durably restored. The government’s provision of
Tier 1 capital can also facilitate the bank’s efforts to raise Tier 2 capital from
private sources. The components of Tier 1 and Tier 2 that are recognized by the
Basel Committee are listed in Box 1. The actions of six countries in providing Tier
1 and Tier 2 capital to recapitalize their banks are shown in Table 2, which reports
the capital instruments used and the means of payment adopted. Table 3 reports
other financial actions, such as granting loans and issuing guarantees.
When recapitalization with public funds leads, in effect, to nationalization,31
this should be regarded as a transitional arrangement designed to strengthen
management and operations, and should lead to reprivatization in due course—
preferably according to a specific time frame. Consequently, the BSA needs to
choose its capital instruments with consideration of its ability to redeem them
later. Two financing decisions need to be made—which instruments to acquire,
and how to pay for them. One option is that the government could purchase
common stock, which may be more marketable than other instruments when the
government decides it wants to recover its investment. The BSA, however, may
not want to take control under circumstances where it believes that privately
controlled operations are more efficient, or where it believes abstaining from
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30See Dziobek (1998).
31Nationalization is the usual outcome in cases where insolvency is deep and the bank is regarded as
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Box 1. Capital Instruments in Use in Banks1
Tier 1 Instruments (Core Capital)
Issued and fully paid ordinary shares
Disclosed reserves from retained after-tax
earnings or other surplus
Perpetual, noncumulative preference shares
Convertible, noncumulative preference shares
Minority interests in equity of less than fully
owned subsidiaries whose accounts are
consolidated and that meet certain conditions
and do not exceed 15% of Tier 1 capital
Innovative, synthetic, capital instruments 
Limited to <15% of consolidated Tier 1 capital




Hybrid debt/equity instruments including,
Cumulative long-term preference shares
Convertible cumulative preference shares





Mandatory convertible debt instruments
Subordinated term debt instruments
including: 
Conventional unsecured subordinated debt
Convertible subordinated debt
Limited-life redeemable preference shares
Deductions from capital
Goodwill




(i) issued and fully paid; 
(ii) noncumulative;
(iii) permanent; 
(iv) able to absorb losses within
the bank on a going-concern
basis;
(v) junior to depositors, general
creditors, and subordinated debt;
(vi) neither secured nor
guaranteed by the issuer; 
(vii) publicly disclosed; and
(viii) immediately and fully
available without limit to the
issuing bank.
Not secured or guaranteed,
callable by issuer only after a




Prudently valued with a discount
<=1.25 % of risk-weighted assets
Must: 
(i) be unsecured, subordinated,
fully paid-up; 
(ii) not be redeemable without
the prior consent of the
supervisor; 
(iii) be available to participate in
losses without the bank having
to cease trading; and
(iv) allow servicing obligations
to be deferred where the bank’s
profitability would not support
payment.
Not normally available to share
losses unless bank closes; thus,
not to exceed 50% of Tier 1
capital.
Minimum original term to
maturity of over five years with
a discount of 20% in each of
last five years to maturity.
Examples of Countries






















Sources: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1998, pp. 1–16, and 1999).
1The precise specifications vary from country to country.
2The Indonesian preference shares are nonvoting.
3Thailand, for example, issues Stapled Limited Interest Preferred Securities (SLIPS) that are attached to high-rate subordinated debt
that pays interest even when there are no profits. U.S. bank holding companies can issue “trust preferred” or “capital securities” and pass
the proceeds on to their banks as Tier 1 capital. European countries have issued “step-up callable preferred securities.”
4Specific loan-loss reserves are not countable as capital under the Basel Capital Accord, although some countries do so. Japan, for
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Source: IMF staff analysis.
1The public sector includes the government, the central bank as lender of last resort (LOLR), the deposit insurance corporation (DIC), the AMC, the restruc-
turing agency, and any vehicle for recapitalizing banks.
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Source: IMF staff analysis.
1The public sector includes the government, the central bank as lender of last resort (LOLR), the deposit insurance corporation (DIC), the asset management
company (AMC), the restructuring agency, and any vehicle for recapitalizing banks.
2The deviation of the guarantee has been extended.
3See Table 4 for the details.asserting such control would significantly increase incentives for the private sector
to bring in more capital. In a situation like this, the BSA would prefer to purchase
convertible preferred shares, which count as Tier 1 capital under the Basel
Committee’s rules, and can be constructed to convey voting rights under a variety
of restricted arrangements. Nonetheless, the government could retain veto rights
on identified strategic issues relating to bank portfolios and operations.
Where the government wishes to obtain control of the bank, in case the bank’s
condition deteriorates, the preferred stock would be converted into common equity
under the specified conditions.32 Convertible, preferred shares count as Tier 1
capital, provided they are undated and noncumulative.33 They carry a prior enti-
tlement to any income earned, but they do not give the holder voting power in
normal circumstances, and so they help to reduce any potential conflict of interest
for the government. The trigger for conversion could, for example, be a decline in
the CAR below some threshold value (4 or 6 percent, for example) or other mate-
rial failure to meet the terms for continued assistance listed in Section II. The rate
for converting preferred into common shares should dilute the common stock and
give the government control.
The tension between satisfying the Basel Committee’s requirement that capital
instruments cannot qualify as Tier 1 capital if they are redeemable and the govern-
ment’s wish to recover its investment over time must be handled by ensuring that
there will be a secondary market where the stock can be sold. The stock can be
designed to give the owners the option to redeem them, with the consent of the
government, if the bank is in good condition, and if the remaining Tier 1 capital
would keep the bank above the minimum requirement after redemption. The
government, however, would not have the power to redeem the shares from the
bank because that would disqualify the shares from inclusion in Tier 1 capital. 
Forms of Payment
In terms of payment, Tier 1 capital provided by private investors should be paid
for by injecting cash; submissions in-kind are not acceptable. The government
may contribute cash and/or bonds (either negotiable or nonnegotiable). Cash and
bonds immediately increase net worth and improve the capital ratios, liquidity, and
potential profitability.34 Bonds are often a convenient source of payment for the
government. The downside to this convenient arrangement is that banks may
prefer to retain the bonds as a risk-free source of income, rather than to make loans
and ease the crisis-induced credit crunch.35 If bonds are to be used, they should
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32The government could also retain specific rather than general voting powers, to allow it to approve
the details of a merger, for example.
33These are popular among “white knight” acquirers because they allow the acquirers to rescue a
corporation, while ensuring that they can exit first if trouble occurs. Convertible preferred shares are being
used by the Japanese government, as well as in Thailand and Indonesia.
34CARs are improved because equity increases and the value of risk-weighted assets falls, as both
cash and government bonds have zero risk weight under the Basel standards.
35Authorities sometimes place indexed bonds with banks to lower the initial costs of debt service and
to mask the full costs of recapitalization. However, costs to the government could rise and banks could
benefit if inflation escalates.pay market, not submarket, interest rates. A decision about whether market rates
will be denominated in nominal or real terms (with the principal indexed for infla-
tion) must be made. Bonds paying fixed nominal rates will give banks greater
liquidity during the early years of the life of the bond over bonds that pay real
rates, but paying nominal rates increases immediate government outlays.36
It is for these reasons that direct placement of government paper with the
banks is the most common practice when purchasing bank capital. As stated previ-
ously, these bonds should pay market rates. As market rates are likely to be high
initially, due to uncertainty, the bonds should carry variable rates, so that the
government’s debt service costs will decline as rates fall.
It might be expected that the government would opt to inject negotiable bonds,
which encourage market development and also facilitate liquidity management by
banks.37 However, there is a risk in supplying negotiable bonds that the recipient
will sell the bonds and reinvest unwisely in unsafe assets in a gamble for recovery.
Fit-and-proper owners and managers, and very close supervision, are necessary to
limit this risk. It may, therefore, be appropriate to contain negotiability for an
initial period when the management, governance, and operational restructuring
plans are being strengthened as part of the terms of government assistance.
Giving Guarantees
During the recent crises, all governments in the major crisis countries have issued
blanket guarantees to a bank’s depositors and frequently its creditors. In addition
to these guarantees on the liabilities of a bank, governments have in some cases
guaranteed bank assets and/or income streams (see Table 3). 
Guaranteeing liabilities forestalls runs and prevents potential losses from
having to sell assets in a fire sale and from high-cost borrowing to repay deposi-
tors. Such a guarantee should enable a return to relative stability in the banking
system, enabling the authorities to deal with the banking situation in a properly
sequenced and calm manner.38 Insofar as the holders of the deposits are other
financial institutions, a guarantee should serve to revive the interbank market,
which typically dries up during a banking crisis, and thus enable the continuation
of intermediation across the banking system.
Guaranteeing income (for instance through “stop-loss guarantees”) allows
banks to increase capital through retained earnings. This may be particularly
helpful for prospective bank purchasers, especially in cases where there is substan-
tial uncertainty about the value of a bank’s assets and prospects for recovery.39
Guarantees are appealing politically because they appear to be a substitute for
additional immediate expenditures on Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital, and they offer some
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36Indonesia has used indexed bonds; see Table 2.
37This has occurred in Korea and Thailand, and is being considered in Indonesia.
38The government of Thailand charges banks 0.4 percent of liabilities annually for the guarantee it is
providing. Indonesia charges banks 0.25 percent of liabilities.
39Among the Asian crisis countries this technique has been used particularly in Thailand, where banks
have not all been subject to audit by international accountants and where the authorities have been partic-
ularly aggressive in seeking new private investors at an early stage.protection against giving windfall gains to bank investors in the event that the
bank’s situation turns out better than expected. Although widely used, they are not
a “free lunch” for the government, which carries contingent liabilities that it may
have to honor. In the absence of proper fiscal transparency, guaranteeing income
may serve to disguise the costs of handling a banking crisis. Guaranteeing assets
may involve providing assistance to the borrowers of a bank, frequently the corpo-
rate sector. With increasing recognition that bank and corporate restructuring are
closely intertwined,40 support for the corporate sector may be part of the authori-
ties’ overall strategy for handling a pervasive economic crisis.
Guaranteeing assets and income—to a level beyond that which is otherwise
projected in the market—increases asset values, which improves the balance sheet and
measured capital.41 Not only will such guarantees raise the market value of the assets
covered, but—if they guarantee a return greater than the written-down value—they
also enable the bank to recover any provisions that it has previously made against the
assets. Both effects will boost capital. However, with proper fiscal accounting, the
contingent claims on the government will need to be shown all at once, as would the
immediate expenditures on bank capitalization. Suspicion therefore exists that coun-
tries that pursue this route may not disclose full fiscal transparency. In any case, there
is rarely, if ever, a full and realistic estimate of the potential costs of the guarantees
when they are given and, thus, may be a major reason for continual escalation of bank
restructuring costs long after the authorities seem to have got a handle on the situation. 
V. Supporting Banks by Transferring Their Assets
In addition to injecting various forms of capital with public funds, the government
can purchase and rehabilitate bank assets and facilitate business- and household-
debt workouts to aid banks. It can also reduce bank liabilities, raise income, and
grant forbearance. The actions of six countries in this area are shown in Table 4.
This section discusses asset rehabilitation and debt workouts. The other types of
actions are reviewed in Section VI.
Asset rehabilitation is an important concomitant reform that either is opera-
tionally linked to capital assistance programs, or otherwise strongly influences the
effectiveness of such programs in supporting economic recovery and thereby reduces
the net cost to the government. Asset rehabilitation is both a substitute for, and a
complement to, capital injections. In principle, bad assets can either be: (1) retained
and managed by banks themselves at appropriately written-down values, while the
banks receive financial assistance from the government for recapitalization; or (2)
relocated or sold to one or more decentralized “bad banks,” loan recovery companies,
or privately owned AMCs that specialize in the management of impaired assets; or
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40Corporate restructuring is beyond the scope of this paper. It is becoming increasingly recognized
that bank restructuring without corporate restructuring may be self-defeating, because if banks’problems
stem from problems with their customers, then addressing customers’ problems is critical to remedying
the underlying situation facing the banks. 
41There are obvious moral hazard effects if the original owners stand to benefit from these guaran-
tees. There is, therefore, a strong case for making the granting of guarantees conditional upon fulfilling
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Source: IMF staff analysis.
1The public sector includes the government, the central bank as lender of last resort (LOLR), the deposit insurance corporation (DIC), the asset management
company (AMC), the restructuring agency, and any vehicle for recapitalizing banks.(3) sold and transferred to a centralized AMC, which is typically state-owned. In the
1997–98 Asian crisis all countries accorded a significant role to this last option. 
The government can purchase some or all of banks’ impaired assets outright,
and such action can be helpful under certain conditions. The value of loans (good
or bad) on the bank’s books will decline and the amounts of cash and government
(or government-guaranteed) bonds will rise. This substitution lowers the value of
risk-weighted assets and raises the risk-weighted CAR.42 It thus facilitates compli-
ance with prudential requirements; moreover, by reducing the riskiness of a bank’s
overall portfolio it may change the incentive structure for banks’ managements.
Asset purchases should, however, be supported by appropriate institutional
arrangements for the resale of assets, debt workouts, and loan recoveries, so as to
maximize the market value of purchased assets, and reduce the ultimate cost to the
government. For this reason the crisis countries have typically created a special
agency—an AMC—to acquire and handle bad assets (see Table 1).
Certain decisions must be made before the creation of an AMC 
1. Do the advantages of asset purchases by a government agency outweigh the
disadvantages and warrant establishment of a centralized AMC? 
2. Should the agency buy only from banks that are to be liquidated, or also
from banks that are being assisted, or from any bank that wishes to sell its
assets, regardless of that bank’s condition, and whether the government has
taken over the bank? 
3. Will the AMC buy both good and bad assets? 
4. Should the AMC warehouse assets (i.e., hold them over a longer period
without trying actively to restructure or dispose of them)? 
5. What prices should it offer for the assets it purchases? 
6. What are the best institutional and operational arrangements for the AMC? 
7. Should the government encourage corporate debt workout and restructuring? 
Countries are taking different positions in answering these questions; some
aspects of these issues which have a direct impact on the success of bank recapi-
talization are discussed below.
The Purchase Price
In general, the authorities should not buy impaired assets at their book value when
recapitalizing the institution because, in effect, this conceals the cost of recapital-
ization from the public.43 Such a transaction subsidizes banks, can be used to bail
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42Under the Basel Capital Accord, loans carry a 100 percent weight, while cash and government
bonds carry a zero or 20 percent weight.
43An exception to the general rule may occur where the government buys banks’loans to public enter-
prises. Where these loans have received an explicit or implicit public guarantee, the government may, with
justification, choose to buy the loans at close to the book value.
A question arises concerning provisions against assets that are purchased by the government. If the
provision is greater than the loss on the sale of the asset, then the bank will benefit from the transaction.
If the excess provisions are reversed in the profit and loss accounts, the government may recoup some of
its outlays in the form of additional taxes on bank profits. This would happen, for example, when a provi-
sion is made for an asset which the government buys at book value.out owners and managers, and violates the principle of transparency and account-
ability.44 A realistic valuation/pricing of assets based on market pricing, sound
accounting norms, strong loan classification and provisioning standards, and/or
discounted present values, is crucial, as previously discussed in Section III. The
rigorous recognition of loan losses is the first and most important element of an
effective strategy for dealing with problem assets, because it creates the right
incentives for banks to restructure their loans, foreclose on collateral, and precip-
itate bankruptcy reorganizations. The sellers of problem assets may be persuaded
to accept conservative valuations if the asset purchase contract allows them to
share unexpectedly good recovery values.
Weighing the Advantages of Asset Purchases
Asset purchases by a separate government agency may have a number of advan-
tages that can aid bank recapitalization and restructuring, and if supported by
proper incentives for loan workout and recovery efforts, could control fiscal costs.
Since banks’ problems are often derived from a deterioration in their loan portfo-
lios, measures directed at the loan portfolios come closest to the source of the
problems and may, therefore, be the most efficient form of remedial action, thus
enabling banks to quickly resume their normal operations.
Such asset purchases achieve economies of scale in asset management, partic-
ularly by centralizing scarce human resources, fostering the development of
secondary markets for bank assets, and allowing the bank to focus on managing
its good assets during its recovery. Handling assets through a centralized AMC is
most appropriate where the banks originally holding the assets have been closed,
where open banks holding the assets have no specific expertise in managing them,
and where many banks may have claims on the same entity (for instance, a
national airline or a major conglomerate).45 In addition, asset purchases (and
recapitalization with public funds generally) can be made conditional upon banks’
participation in debt workouts for borrowers and the achievement of loan recovery
performance targets for the assets retained in banks. Indeed, asset purchases/trans-
fers complement a recapitalization package (for reasons already mentioned in
Section II) with the allocation of funds between asset purchases and direct recap-
italization varying among countries, according to specific institutional circum-
stances.46 They can serve as an additional inducement to a bank for compliance
with the conditions for a recapitalization package.
Problem assets should be purchased—with bonds or cash—at realistic and fair
prices. As stated above, cash and bonds have lower risk weights than loans, and
will thus raise the bank’s risk-weighted CAR, as well as change operating incen-
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44There are examples in Asia and elsewhere of assets purchased at inflated prices. However, in Indonesia
and Malaysia, the asset management agency has stated that asset purchases are to be based on realistic values.
45Legal deficiencies may also be handled more easily through a centralized agency. See Stone (1998).
46By mid-1996, Mexico had spent two-thirds of its projected net outlays to purchase bad loans and
support debtors; only one-third went to recapitalize banks. See Ito and Folkerts-Landau (1996), pp.
114–16. Countries typically purchase bad loans and support debtors when banks’ internal governance is
weak and property rights are poorly defended by the legal system.tives for banks’managements. A swap of classified assets whose yields are uncer-
tain for bonds that carry market rates may also reduce bank’s funding costs by
decreasing uncertainty. An exchange for cash or bonds, which are negotiable or
can be discounted at the central bank, improves bank liquidity and permits banks
to make loans or other investments, and to increase income.47
Asset purchases by a separate AMC have several important potential disad-
vantages, however. First, they do not raise banks’net worth unless the operation
is done at above market prices, which, as discussed above, should be avoided.
Asset purchases, thus, do not solve a problem of lack of capital in the banking
sector. Second, the government needs to consider the overall cost of this form of
assistance, as the expenses it incurs in disposing of the troubled assets may be
high and difficult to estimate, depending on the legal and operational environ-
ment for loan recovery and the likelihood of being subject to political pressure.
Third, asset purchases may provide liquidity if purchased, for example, with
cash or negotiable bonds. As with a direct capital infusion, such additional
liquidity would need to be managed in order to avoid any potential conflict with
the monetary stance. Moreover, as with capital infusions, asset purchases can
distort incentives if banks come to expect that the government will bail them out
in the future by repeatedly buying their bad assets. Again, the pricing of the
assets is the key issue.48
Overall, while one cannot draw universal conclusions, there do seem to be
conditions under which the advantages of asset purchases by a separate AMC
outweigh the disadvantages. These conditions must include an AMC staffed by
financial experts who are both honest and skilled in asset management and sale,
with operations that are transparent and cost-effective for the government. The
AMC should have, if necessary, special legal powers to expedite loan recovery and
loan restructuring and should be constructed as a temporary agency—for handling
a special situation, not a permanent arrangement—in order to preserve a good
incentive structure.
Should the AMC Buy Assets from All Banks?
Some countries have chosen to acquire and sell assets only from banks that are
being resolved by liquidation or merger.49 Other countries also provide assistance
to banks that are to remain open by buying their bad assets.50
When the AMC purchases assets from open banks, a potential conflict arises
between economizing limited resources and being fair to all banks. Buying bad
assets only from troubled banks that are targeted to receive government assistance
could affect the survival probabilities of better banks that are still struggling,
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47If the assets are purchased at written-down values, and if banks have already provisioned to those
values, the sale of the assets should have no direct impact on a bank’s profitability.
48If the centralized AMC is dealing with private banks, it is particularly important to determine
transfer prices that do not involve an implicit subsidy, and such determination is quite complex in times
of uncertainty.
49Thailand and the United States have taken this approach.
50Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, and Mexico have bought bad assets from open banks.unaided, with a portfolio of bad loans. One way for the government to resolve this
dilemma is to buy some, but not all, of the bad assets of assisted banks; assisted
banks should be left with roughly the same proportion of bad loans as the rest of
the survivors in the industry.51
Should the AMC Buy Only Impaired Assets?
The AMC, given the purpose of restoring banks to good health and of promoting
corporate restructuring should, in general, purchase only impaired assets. Good
assets left with banks, and those that are transferred to banks in exchange for bad
assets, are the means to rehabilitate bank profitability and soundness. 
When banks have a choice about which assets to transfer, they may seek to
“cherry pick” and provide just the worst ones. Similarly, if the AMC can choose
its assets, it will choose those where it sees the best possible returns.52 This
problem can, to some extent, be avoided by ensuring that sales are at a “fair” price,
and by defining classes of assets—as “loss” or “doubtful” by the bank’s auditors—
which are to be transferred in their entirety.
Should the AMC Warehouse Assets?
There is disagreement about whether the AMC should warehouse assets. Some
believe that selling assets, as soon as they have been catalogued and adequately
serviced in preparation for sale, will establish a floor for asset prices in the economy.
Establishing that floor will provide a turning point for economic recovery. They
argue that warehousing assets prevents price adjustments, particularly where
markets have ceased to function in the crisis, and the overhang of the stored assets
impedes price discovery and market recovery, and prolongs the recession. Finding
the price floor will promote a speedier recovery. Proponents of prompt sale also
point to the danger of asset deterioration while under government control and claim
that restoring assets to the private markets will ensure better maintenance. 
Others disagree with this view; they believe that a “fire sale” will accentuate
the depth of the recession. Thus, they argue that assets should be warehoused and
released for sale slowly in order not to flood the market. Warehousing, they assert,
will increase the net present value of the amount the government receives when it
sells the assets and will reduce the taxpayers’ ultimate costs. The balance struck
between these two options varies from country to country. The United States was
particularly active in quickly on-selling assets taken over during the savings and
loan crisis, although commentators suggest that the far greater depth of the
markets in the United States means that it is not an appropriate model for other
countries. Among the Asian crisis countries, Thailand has been forceful in quickly
selling assets taken over by the public sector.
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51This was the approach adopted by Sweden. See Ingves and Lind (1997).
52Where there have been governance problems associated with some assets, the bank may be reluc-
tant to transfer them for fear that these problems would come to light. This has arguably been one of the
reasons for the protracted process of transferring loans to the AMC in Indonesia. Institutional and Operational Arrangements
There are various institutional structures that will permit the asset management
component of the BRA to accomplish its tasks. The institutional arrangements to
work out or to recover problem assets could mean several roles for governments—
to adequately and flexibly respond to different bank circumstances and market
requirements.53 As discussed in Section V, a proactive and centralized role for
governments (e.g., government-owned asset management units) could be desirable
in some circumstances (e.g., to deal with a large volume of problem assets
acquired in mergers, bank closures, and recapitalizations, or to deal with large,
legally complicated exposures). In contrast, an enabling role for governments that
involves decentralized arrangements (e.g., debt-workout units within banks them-
selves, or separately capitalized loan recovery and asset management companies)
is the most appropriate in many circumstances. For example, most impaired loans
where the borrower itself has value as a going concern, and there is a likelihood
that the borrower can pay after some financial restructuring, should remain with
the originating bank or its successor. However, some small- and medium-sized
loans or some insider loans, where the value lies mainly in recovery from under-
lying assets or collaterals, are often handled by separate loan-recovery companies
outside of the banks.54
Operational aspects of the AMC are largely beyond the scope of this paper;
however, they are relevant to the curtailing of government costs in bank recapital-
ization. In its activities, the AMC will rely on the valuation that has already been
made of bank assets, the prognosis for recovery previously made by individual
banks, and the identification of banks already deemed eligible for government
assistance. The AMC’s tasks are to ensure performance of the loans; take control
of the assets, including legal title to collateral; protect real assets from deteriora-
tion; improve them if possible; prepare them for marketing; sell them at the best
possible price; and go out of business when it has fulfilled its obligations. There
are two extreme approaches to asset management. One is to treat each asset sepa-
rately, selling real property item by item and holding individual loans to maturity
while pursuing legal options to force borrowers to service their debts.55 The
second, at the opposite end of the spectrum on approaches, is to package the assets
and sell them by auction in bulk.56 The two choices reflect opinions about whether
the AMC should own the assets or merely act as the agent handling the assets. The
latter approach was used by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in the
United States, but in other countries the authorities have preferred direct owner-
ship so they can essentially regroup and reorganize the assets before selling them.
Again, no clear preference can be determined; different tools are appropriate in
different cases.57
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53See Nyberg (1997).
54Existing bank-client ties may, in fact, reflect a “cozy” relationship that could impede an aggressive
liquidation process.
55This is the approach adopted in Lithuania as described in Maldeikis (1998).
56This approach is being used in Thailand, as described in Vichit-Vadakan (1998).
57For instance, it may be particularly productive to hold and repackage property companies before
trying to sell them.Contractors from the private sector can assist regardless of which approach is
adopted by ensuring the performance of the loans. They can design and maintain
a computerized database of the assets acquired and an electronic system for
tracking loan conditions and dispositions. Investment bankers and other financial
experts can design classification criteria for packaging assets, prepare the assets
for marketing as securities, and conduct asset auctions.
Encouraging Loan Workouts
AMCs and banks can facilitate debt workouts and debt restructuring of potentially
viable corporate borrowers. Countries have taken widely disparate approaches to
this tool. During the course of bank restructuring, some leave it to the banks them-
selves and to the private sector.58 Other countries have been more active in
working out and restructuring loans, especially where they believe that the legal
system is inadequate in supporting purely private negotiations or where there are
market failures.59 However, if carefully constructed, debt workouts can support
recapitalization efforts, whether done through capital injections or asset purchases.
They should reduce debt or debt-service burdens and improve borrowers’abilities
to repay their loans, thereby reducing the volume of nonperforming assets on
banks’ books without destroying, in the long run, the incentive structure for
borrowers to repay their loans.
The enabling role of governments in facilitating loan-workout arrangements
can take several forms, and can be an important component of bank recapital-
ization. Appropriate legal frameworks for bankruptcy and for dealing with
collateral are, of course, necessary whatever the institutional mechanisms are for
handling problem assets. Possible governmental actions range from the informal
and decentralized to the formal and centralized.60 In the informal decentralized
approach the government provides incentives to encourage, and offers guidance
on conducting, loan workouts. Taking a more active stance, it might arbitrate
disputes among private negotiators. The ultimate interventionist action is to
form a centralized AMC and have the government buy banks’bad debts in order
to renegotiate, manage, and sell them. The right choice depends on the serious-
ness of the problem. In cases of deep insolvency and, ultimately, government
ownership of banks, a government-owned AMC (or AMCs) is the likely
outcome, while in less severe cases, a privately owned AMC is more likely. In
many cases, both types of AMCs are needed to maximize loan recovery, in addi-
tion to building up effective loan-workout capacity within banks themselves to
deal with normal credit risks.
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58Japan and the United States have followed this approach.
59Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, and Thailand have assisted in the restructuring of private debt.
The government of Mexico has been particularly active in providing support to households and small and
medium-sized businesses. Corporate restructuring is being done privately with government encourage-
ment.
60See Stone (1998).Governments have often played a catalytic role in fostering corporate-debt
restructuring, either as a component of bank recapitalization or as a separate
complementary policy in times of banking crisis.61 One framework for debtor-
creditor negotiations where the government encourages corporate restructuring is
the “London Approach,” which does not have any direct linkage to capital support
facilities.62 When advising the parties or arbitrating disputes between private
negotiators, the government can encourage banks or other acquirers to restructure
loans, and retain and recover impaired loans of uncertain value through govern-
ment guarantees under income-maintenance, loss-sharing, stop-loss, or put-back
provisions during a specified period.63 There could also be arrangements for
acquirers and sellers to share profits, if assets are sold or recovered for more than
a specified amount.
In summary, the choice of institutional and regulatory arrangements for
asset management, loan recovery, and corporate-debt restructuring is among the
most critical aspects of successful bank recapitalization. The design of these
arrangements should ensure realistic valuation of impaired assets, prompt recog-
nition of loan losses, and a balanced and pragmatic approach to asset disposition
that is neither too rapid nor too slow, to avoid losses on assets. Specific institu-
tional choices to achieve these goals will depend also on the legal and gover-
nance constraints, the nature of the problem assets, and the size and distribution
of these assets among banks. One cannot say which specific measures are best
or should be adopted; the authorities will need to determine their policies on a
case-by-case basis.
VI. Other Actions to Aid Bank Recapitalization
Governments frequently try to aid banks in recapitalizing by reducing their liabilities,
improving their income, and granting forbearance. Many of the techniques employed
disrupt monetary and fiscal management, distort incentives, and reduce transparency.
Because of these efforts, these techniques should be adopted cautiously, if at all.
Nevertheless, they are being used in certain countries (see Table 5).
Reducing Liabilities
Rather than increase bank’s assets to match its liabilities, the authorities may seek to
reduce its liabilities to the level of its assets. Such a program is, however, often
constrained by the comprehensiveness of guarantees already given to depositors and
creditors (e.g., in the Asian crisis countries and Mexico), and the legal framework
governing their rights under bank-bankruptcy laws. However, even where there is a
comprehensive guarantee by the government or the central bank, it may be possible
to reduce the size of the bank’s balance sheet by converting liquidity support from
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61Examples of the former approach include bank recapitalization schemes linked to bank conciliation
agreements in Poland, or to debt workout and restructuring in Thailand. See Montes-Negret and Papi (1977),
and the capital-support schemes announced by the Ministry of Finance of Thailand on August 14, 1998.
62See Kent (1996 and 1997).
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1The public sector includes the government, the central bank as lender of last resort (LOLR), the deposit insurance corporation (DIC), the asset management
company (AMC), the restructuring agency, and any vehicle for recapitalizing banks.the central bank into bank capital, thereby changing the management incentive struc-
ture, particularly as regards the size and riskiness of the bank’s portfolio.
Improving Income
The authorities sometimes assist banks through measures to improve the latter’s
income stream, including more lenient tax treatment of banks in various forms,
and public sector loans or deposits at below-market interest rates, to improve
income and liquidity. Such measures are not transparent and do not adequately
address the problem of capital shortage while distorting monetary and fiscal
management.
Granting Regulatory Forbearance
Measures of regulatory forbearance64 adopted in six countries are shown in Table
5. They range from counting certain items as capital in violation of the Basel
Capital Accord, to relaxing loan classification and provisioning standards, to
phasing in the minimum CAR. Forbearance can be hidden or explicit, and
concealed forbearance should be eschewed. Forbearance that allows banks to
disguise their losses and recognize them only slowly over time is particularly
objectionable. However, in a crisis, one form of explicit regulatory forbearance—
phasing in prudential and regulatory standards—can be a useful tool that facili-
tates recapitalization. The capital adequacy standard can be explicitly and
temporarily reduced to some positive number below the desired standard, such as
the Basel Committee’s recommended 8 percent or a larger ratio. Banks, under
closely monitored conditions, can then be allowed to raise capital over time on a
specified and uniformly applied schedule, toward a desirable CAR.65
Sometimes countries choose to tighten loan-loss provisioning standards grad-
ually over time, rather than adopt a gradual approach toward desired capital ratios
with full compliance of provisioning rules. The gradual approach to desired capital
ratios is preferable to the gradual increase in provisioning because it is more trans-
parent. Moreover, the latter can reduce incentives for prompt recognition of asset
values that are needed to support loan workout and efficient asset-management
arrangements.
VII. Conclusion
Recapitalizing and restructuring banks in the aftermath of a systemic crisis is a
complex process that typically requires significant government intervention and
takes several years to design and implement. To be effective, it must be carried out
in a coordinated, prompt, but carefully prepared manner that reconciles financial
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64Regulatory forbearance is used here in the sense of adopting a time-bound and internally consistent
strategy for achieving prudential standards, rather than being required to achieve those standards imme-
diately. It is not the same as neglecting prudential standards in the hope that conditions will simply
improve.
65For example, United States, FDIC (1998).and human resource needs with resource constraints, and provides an incentive
structure that will foster financial stability in the future. It requires careful
management both at the strategic level and at the individual-bank level in order to
ensure that government investment in banks yields the maximum return and that
an efficient and sound banking system emerges at the end of the process.
Achievement of these objectives requires effective institutional and organiza-
tional arrangements to make recapitalization and restructuring decisions, to
manage impaired assets, and to foster rapid corporate restructuring. The
approaches to recapitalization have varied, with countries choosing different
mixes of direct capital injections and asset purchases and rehabilitation. In an
effective recapitalization process, the two approaches are generally complemen-
tary, but a balance between the two approaches (which differs from country to
country) is necessary in order to minimize the expected present value of govern-
ment outlays, net of recoveries.
New investment in banks may also be encouraged by government efforts to aid
the restructuring of corporate and consumer debt so that loan quality can improve.
For example, lengthening maturities or debt-equity conversions can enable some
borrowers, who would otherwise default, to repay their debt and reduce uncer-
tainty in the market.
As restructuring and recapitalization proceed, and as financial stability is
restored, the activities of the agencies established to handle these functions will
change. They will shift from planning and implementation to preparation for
cessation and closure. The BRA, BSA, and AMC will complete their assigned
tasks and close down. As their terminations approach, the authorities must prepare
to replace the full guarantee, if any, with a limited deposit insurance system, and
make sure that the traditional mechanisms for effective corporate governance are
firmly in place to preserve financial stability.
APPENDIX I
Glossary
Asset-backed bonds. Income from a homogenous bundle of assets can be used to pay the
interest on collateralized bonds sold to pay for the purchase of the assets. The bonds may be sold in
several tiers depending on the priority of their claim over the income from the assets. The claims with
the highest priority have the least risk, and those holding residual claims after all other bond-holders
have been paid, are the most risky. Financial institutions have widely used this technique to sell their
mortgages to a mortgage banker who securitizes the loans. It is now being adapted for marketing
impaired assets. The issuer of the bonds may offer an interest guarantee on some tranches of the debt.
Asset management company (AMC). A separately capitalized institution, owned privately,
publicly or jointly, that is established for a limited period of time to restructure, manage, and sell the
problem assets acquired during bank closures and restructuring. A country may establish one central-
ized AMC or a number of decentralized ones.
Bad bank. The portion of a troubled bank that represents the “bad” assets. Sound assets and
often some of the liabilities, particularly the insured deposits, go to the “good bank,” for example, in
a purchase and assumption transaction. The nonperforming assets go to the “bad bank,” which typi-
cally does not accept deposits from the public. The bank’s principal liability is likely to be the equity
of its public or private owner.
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coordinate the implementation of the comprehensive strategy for bank restructuring and recapitaliza-
tion. This agency coordinates with other government agencies and is accountable to the government
for the restructuring process.
Bank support authority (BSA). The subsidiary of the BRA that provides financial support to
banks that continue to operate.
Bridge bank. A newly chartered, nationalized bank established and operated by the authorities
on an interim basis to acquire the assets and assume the liabilities of failing institutions, until final
resolution can be accomplished. The use of bridge banks is generally limited to situations in which
more time is needed to permit the least costly resolution of a large or complex institution.
CAMELS rating. The quality rating for banks that typically ranges from 1 for the best banks to
5 for the worst. CAMELS stands for capital, asset quality, management capacity, earnings, liquidity,
and systemic risk.
Centralized approach to asset management. One centralized AMC, which is common to all
banks and may be government- or privately-owned, recovers value from troubled assets individually
or in bulk through debt servicing, debt renegotiations, asset swaps, liquidations, and sales of collat-
eral. The AMC may also be involved in corporate restructuring.
Comfort letter. A letter from the owners and managers indicating their willingness to perform
certain actions required by a supervisor, such as being prepared to recapitalize a bank when
instructed.
Debt auction.A debtor asks individual creditors to submit bids indicating the percentage repay-
ment they would be willing to accept in settlement of their debts. The debtor then repays those
submitting the smallest percentages, probably paying a uniform, cut-off price.
Debt workouts. Agreements between borrowers and lenders to restructure the debts of heavily
indebted borrowers. Restructuring a loan for a financially distressed borrower can be more produc-
tive for a bank than foreclosing on the collateral or initiating lawsuits to collect on the debt.
Decentralized approach to asset management. Each bank retains financial responsibility for
working out its problem assets. Its workout unit may be run as a separate department of the banks or
as a wholly-owned subsidiary.
Due diligence. The on-site inspection of the books and records of a failing institution. Before an
institution’s failure, the authorities invite potential purchasers to the institution to review pertinent
files so they can make informed decisions about the value of the failing institution’s assets. Such
potential purchasers must sign a confidentiality agreement. In addition, contractors may be hired to
perform due diligence on assets that are earmarked for multi-asset sales initiatives. 
Essentiality. An exception to the financial criteria that should usually govern eligibility for
recapitalization with public funds may be made when a bank provides essential, irreplaceable services
to the economy and/or is too large to be closed.
Fit-and-proper test. An evaluation of the competence, integrity, qualifications, and experience
of the owner, senior managers, and directors of a bank. This evaluation involves background checks
on whether previous activities, including adverse regulatory or judicial decisions, raise doubts
concerning competence, sound judgment, or honesty.
Franchise value. The franchise value is the discounted present value of the bank’s future profits.
Thus, a bank with zero net worth could have a positive franchise value, which an acquirer would be
willing to buy. Deposits that can be invested at a positive profit have a positive franchise value.
Good bank. A bank whose bad assets have been removed.
Income (or yield) maintenance agreement. A resolution method used by the authorities to
guarantee a market rate of return on certain assets of troubled banks. For example, the authorities may
pay the holder the difference between the current yield on assets and the bank’s average cost of funds.
These agreements can also be used to facilitate mergers and Purchase and Assumptions (P&As)
between troubled banks and healthy institutions.
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undercapitalized bank may be nationalized, placed in conservatorship, or given capital assistance
while under close supervision.
Loss-sharing agreement. An agreement between the acquiring bank and the authorities
regarding the sharing of losses in a failed bank. Loss sharing aims to sell as many assets of a failed
bank as possible to the private sector and align the interests and incentives of the acquiring bank and
the authorities so that the assets are well-managed and maximum recoveries are obtained. Under loss
sharing, the authorities agree to absorb a significant portion of the loss—typically 80 percent—on a
specified pool of assets while offering even greater loss protection in the event of financial catas-
trophe. The acquiring bank is liable for the remaining portion of the loss.
Memorandum of understanding (MOU).A written statement indicating agreement between a
bank and its supervisor that the bank perform certain actions.
Noncumulative preferred shares. A perpetual component of Tier 1 capital that provides the
owners with special voting rights as well as a fixed amount of dividends, where the bank’s financial
results permit.
Open-bank assistance. A term used especially in the United States to indicate financial assis-
tance to a bank that will be allowed to continue in business. That bank may be briefly closed and its
shareholders wiped out to be reopened as a temporary bridge bank or, as in the case of Continental
Illinois National Bank, shareholders may be allowed to retain some residual ownership rights.
Options. A call option gives the right, but not the obligation to purchase an asset at an agreed-
upon price at a specified date (European option), or within a specified period (American option). A
put option conveys a similar right, but not the obligation to sell.
Profit sharing. Gives the government an opportunity to share in the upside potential when the
economy recovers. A government-owned asset management company (AMC), for example, may lend
funds to a private sector acquirer to enable him to purchase restructured assets. In addition to paying
interest, the acquirer may agree to convey, for instance, 20 percent of the profits he earns on the acqui-
sition, to the AMC.
Purchase and assumption (P&A). An acquiring bank purchases the assets and assumes the
liabilities of a failed bank. The transaction may cover all of the assets (whole bank P&A), or the best
part of the assets (“good bank” P&A).
Put-back provision. A provision under which an assuming institution has the option of
returning to the authorities, within a specified time period, certain assets that have been transferred to
the acquiring institution.
Risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio. The Basel Capital Accord assigns risk-weights to on-
and off balance sheet exposures, according to broad categories of relative riskiness. The Accord sets
minimum capital ratio requirements for internationally active banks of 4 percent for Tier 1 capital and
8 percent for total capital in relation to risk-weighted assets.
Securitization. The AMC can hire an expert investment bank to set criteria for packaging a
bundle of impaired assets into a relatively homogeneous group. Asset-backed bonds are then sold to
finance the asset purchase. These assets will be serviced either by the AMC or by a company expert
in this task and the income received will be used to pay the interest owed on the bonds. 
Stop-loss agreement. A “stop-loss” agreement imposes limits on the acquirer’s exposure to
unanticipated losses on the shared loss-assets. If asset losses exceed the authorities’ best estimate of
the loss, their percentage coverage is then increased, for instance, to 95 percent, and the acquiring
bank’s exposure is reduced to 5 percent of the loss.
Triage. The division of institutions between those that need no help, those that are worth
helping, and those that are beyond help.
Warrants to purchase. Securities that give their holders the right to purchase a certain number
of the shares of common stock in a corporation, at a pre-set price and under pre-defined conditions.
Yield maintenance agreement. See income-maintenance agreement.
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Figure A1. Institutional Framework: Indonesia
Source: IMF staff analysis.
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Figure A2. Institutional Framework: Japan1
Source: IMF staff analysis.
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Figure A3. Institutional Framework: Korea
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Figure A6. Institutional Framework: Sweden





























Figure A7. Institutional Framework: Thailand





























Figure A8. Institutional Framework: U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Model
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Figure A9. Institutional Framework: U.S. Resolution Trust Corporation Model
Source: IMF staff analysis.REFERENCES
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